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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ON THE EXPANSION OF “WELFARE” AND “HEALTH” UNDER
MEDICAID

LAURA D. HERMER*
ABSTRACT
Medicaid was intended from its inception to provide financial access to
health care for certain categories of impoverished Americans. While rooted in
historical welfare programs, it was meant to afford the “deserving” poor
access to the same sort of health care that other, wealthier Americans
received. Yet despite this seemingly innocuous and laudable purpose, it has
become a front in the political and social battles waged over the last several
decades on the issues of welfare and the safety net. The latest battleground pits
competing visions of Medicaid. One vision seeks to transform Medicaid from a
health care program into something sharing key trappings of cash welfare
programs. Despite the delinkage of Medicaid in most respects from cash
welfare with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, some states sought to tie access to Medicaid
benefits to adherence to particular healthy behaviors, completion of preventive
care measures, and assumption of increased financial responsibility. This
trend has increased in the post-Affordable Care Act environment. A competing
vision in states seeks to include within Medicaid’s auspices various means of
ameliorating not merely medical problems, but also socioeconomic
determinants of health. States taking this route are heeding data supporting the
premise that, in order to better and more cheaply address the health care
needs of everyone, we need to address not only financial access to health care
but also environmental, economic, and social factors that can lead to bad
health. I will examine these competing visions of Medicaid, and consider the
extent to which the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services can arguably grant lawful waivers to these states for these expansions
or constrictions. I will further consider the implications of these visions, and
their success or failure, on Medicaid’s longer-term prospects, as well as on the
greater health care system.

* Professor, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, St. Paul, MN.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most Americans believe that everyone should have health insurance. A
Harris poll taken in the summer of 2015 found that a large majority of
Americans believe that having a system that ensures that people who get sick
can obtain the care they need is a moral issue, and that the United States (U.S.)
should have a universal health care system so that everyone would have
affordable access to medical care. 1
Yet, we do not all agree on the best way to achieve full coverage. The
same poll, for example, found that a bare majority of respondents thought that
“[i]t should be everybody’s personal responsibility to figure out how to get
their health insurance, not the government’s responsibility.” 2 At the same time,
even more respondents believed that the U.S. should have universal coverage,
and that, if other “advanced countries” had universal coverage, we could as
well. 3
This divergence may have to do with a fundamental disagreement
regarding why everyone should have health insurance. Is it a matter of personal
responsibility, or collective risk-sharing? Should people have to prove to the
rest of us that they are contributing members of society before they get
assistance paying for the high price of coverage, or is health coverage more
properly viewed as a precondition of being able to meaningfully contribute in
the first place? What help, if any, should any of us get in making sure that we
are insured? Does it matter that most of us receive substantial financial
subsidies from the federal and state governments in the form of tax
exemptions—the value of which rise with the more money we make—and that
we did so for decades before the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was ever
enacted?
In the realm of Medicaid, these issues are being played out at the state
level. This article will look at two different states, Indiana and Oregon, that
have taken widely disparate approaches to the question of why people should
have coverage, and what they should do in order to deserve it. Admittedly,
available data is incomplete and at times scant. Moreover, there are many other
factors besides the availability and terms of coverage that impact the factors
under consideration here. Nevertheless, I will argue, based on the available
data, that, of the two states, Oregon’s approach to Medicaid is not merely more
likely to further the goals of Medicaid, but is also likelier than Indiana’s
approach to help lead to a healthier and more productive population overall.

1. Dennis Thompson, Most Americans View Access to Health Care as a Moral Issue,
HARRIS POLL (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.theharrispoll.com/politics/Health-Care-MoralIssue.html.
2. Id.; Gallup has found similar results. Healthcare System, GALLUP (2016), http://www.gal
lup.com/poll/4708/healthcare-system.aspx?version=print.
3. Thompson, supra note 1.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 1115 MEDICAID WAIVERS
Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state public program that provides health
care to certain low-income Americans. 4 Generally, the federal government sets
the baseline terms for the program and is responsible for overseeing the
compliance with those terms by state Medicaid programs. 5 State governments
generally determine the shape and form of their Medicaid programs within the
confines set by the federal government, administer their programs, and request
waivers from certain federal requirements where they deem such to be
desirable. 6
Because of its hybrid nature, federal law already gives states a certain
amount of discretion in designing and implementing their Medicaid programs. 7
The potential availability of waivers under Section 1115 otherwise expands
this discretion substantially. 8 The law authorizing Section 1115 waivers
predates the Medicaid program. 9 Section 1115 gives the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) broad discretion to waive
requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a at a state’s request, in order to test
an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the judgment of the
Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid
Act].” 10 Such waivers are supposed to be “budget neutral;” in other words,
they are not supposed to increase programmatic costs beyond what the state’s
Medicaid program would have spent in the absence of the waiver. 11

4. Medicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-informa
tion/medicaid-and-chip-program-information.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
5. Id.; see also Federal Policy Guidance, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/feder
al-policy-guidance/federal-policy-guidance.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(1), 1396a(kk)(1)-(3) (2012). Section 1396a addresses general
programmatic requirements for state Medicaid programs, ranging from a state Medicaid
program’s geographic coverage to provider and supplier screening, oversight, and reporting
requirements within the program. Id.
7. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(d)(1) (2012).
9. Waivers, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION (2015),
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/waivers/. Section 1115 was added to the Social Security Act in
1962. Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a
Standard, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 8, 10 (1994).
10. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74–271, § 1115, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012)). Such requirements include, e.g., rules involving premiums and
cost sharing by beneficiaries (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(14) (2012)), beneficiary freedom of choice of
providers (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (2012)), and timing of initial enrollment (42 U.S.C. §§
1396a(a)(8) & (34) (2012)).
11. This requirement is not provided in the statute, but rather is based on longstanding HHS
policy. See e.g., Medicaid Program; Demonstration Proposals Pursuant to Section 1115(a) of the
Social Security Act; Policies and Procedures, 59 Fed. Reg. (Sept. 27, 1994), https://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-09-27/html/94-23808.htm [hereinafter Medicaid Program; Demonstration
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Waivers were used relatively sparingly in the context of Medicaid until the
early 1990s, and usually only addressed limited populations or geographic
regions within a state. 12 This changed in the 1990s during the Clinton era. 13
The General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office
(GAO)) found in 1995 that twenty-two states sought waivers in the preceding
three years, primarily to move from a fee-for-service to a managed care
delivery system, and to use anticipated savings from the transition to cover
previously uninsured populations. 14 Cost-containment was a primary objective
of these waivers, one that has often remained a feature, to a greater or lesser
degree, of such applications to the present date. 15
The Administration of President George W. Bush encouraged states to
become more creative in their waiver plans, and sought greater use of private
coverage in the process. In 2001, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) invited states to participate in its Health Insurance Flexibility
and Accountability (HIFA) program. 16 This Section 1115 waiver initiative
focused on expanding coverage, often through private means, to individuals
earning less than 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL), ostensibly without
the expenditure of any new funds. 17 Because the expansions were, as per
longstanding policy, supposed to be budget neutral, the administration

Proposals] (noting that “[t]he Department’s fiduciary obligations in a period of extreme budgetary
stringency require maintenance of the principle of cost neutrality”).
12. The GAO notes that Oregon’s 1991 Section 1115 Medicaid waiver application was the
first that the federal government had received in ten years. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HEHS-96-44, MEDICAID SECTION 1115 WAIVERS: FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO APPROVING
DEMONSTRATIONS COULD INCREASE FEDERAL COSTS 25, 25 nn.30, 31 (1995), http://www.gao.
gov/assets/160/155296.pdf [hereinafter GAO/HEHS-96-44]. Once applications started coming in,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued rules for the use of such waivers
in the Medicaid program. See generally Medicaid Program; Demonstration Proposals, supra note
11.
13. Saundra K. Schneider, Medicaid Section 1115 Waivers: Shifting Health Care Reform to
the States, 27 PUBLIUS 89, 99 (1997); Paul Richter, Clinton Orders Easier Medicaid Rules for
States, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993.
14. GAO/HEHS-96-44, supra note 12, at 13.
15. See generally id. The Ninth Circuit, at least, has suggested that cost containment is not,
on its own, a sufficient basis for the Secretary to grant a Section 1115 waiver. Newton-Nations v.
Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069
(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Secretary’s obligation under § 1315 to ‘make some judgment that the
project has a research or a demonstration value’ cannot be satisfied by ‘[a] simple benefits cut,
which might save money, but has no research or experimental goal.’”).
16. President George W. Bush, President Announces Medicaid Reform in Weekly Radio
Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 4, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/08/20010804.html.
17. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, USING MEDICAID DOLLARS TO
COVER THE UNINSURED (2008), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/Waiver%20Re
newal/All%20States%20Chart.pdf.
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permitted states to increase cost-sharing amounts for optional populations,
obtain funding from employers and nonprofits, and—at least initially—to use
unspent State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 18 funds. 19 They
could also offer different benefit packages than the standard Medicaid benefit
package to the expansion population. 20
Multiple states took up the Administration’s invitation to experiment with
their Medicaid programs, whether through the HIFA initiative or otherwise. By
the end of the Bush Administration, at least fifteen HIFA waivers had been
approved, and at least forty-three states had at least one active Section 1115
Medicaid waiver. 21 These waivers were used for a wide variety of purposes,
including the privatization of Medicaid coverage in certain regions of a state, 22
creating a single, state-run managed care organization, 23 requiring certain
18. After the GAO spent years questioning the use of SCHIP funds (now CHIP funds) to
cover adults, Congress eventually restricted the use of SCHIP funds to coverage of children and
fetuses. Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, §
112, 123 Stat. 8, 29 (2009) (codified as enacted at 42 U.S.C. § 1397kk(a) (2012)); see also, e.g.,
Letter from Kathryn Allen, Dir., Health Care, U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, to Senators Charles
Grassley and Max Baucus, (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92413.pdf.
The legal and policy concerns that we raised in our July 2002 report remain: HHS
continues to approve waivers allowing states to use SCHIP to fund health insurance
coverage for childless adults, despite SCHIP’s statutory objective of expanding coverage
to low-income children. We believe that these approvals are inconsistent with SCHIP’s
goals because they allow SCHIP funds to be diverted from the needs of low-income
children. In the absence of congressional clarification of whether SCHIP funds may be
used to cover parents and guardians of Medicaid- or SCHIP-eligible children without
regard to cost-effectiveness, we also question HHS’s approval of additional waiver
proposals for such coverage.
Id.
19. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., APPLICATION TEMPLATE FOR
INSURANCE FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (HIFA) § 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROPOSAL
(2001).
20. See, e.g., id. at 5-6 (listing the different alternate benefit packages available for optional
and expansion populations).
21. Adam Atherly et al., The Effect of HIFA Waiver Expansions on Uninsurance Rates in
Adult Populations, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 939, 941-43 (2012); see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 17.
22. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FLORIDA MANAGED MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 2 (2015), https://www.medi
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/fl/fl-medi
caid-reform-ca.pdf (noting that “The Florida Medicaid Reform demonstration was approved
October 19, 2005. The state implemented the demonstration July 1, 2006, in Broward and Duval
Counties, and then expanded to Baker, Clay, and Nassau Counties July 1, 2007.”).
23. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., VERMONT GLOBAL COMMITMENT TO
HEALTH DEMONSTRATION SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 2 (2015), https://www.medicaid.
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/vt/vt-global-com
mitment-to-health-ca.pdf [hereinafter VERMONT] (noting that “The Global Commitment to
Health Section 1115(a) demonstration was initiated in September 2005, and is designed to use a
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Medicaid beneficiaries to adhere to “personal responsibility” pledges or else
forfeit certain benefits, 24 and extending private coverage to childless adults on
the condition, among others, that beneficiaries contribute a set percentage of
their income in a medical spending account, 25 complete a health needs
assessment in order to match beneficiaries to different private managed care
plans, 26 or receive only a limited ambulatory benefit package. 27
multi-disciplinary approach including the basic principles of public health, the fundamentals of
effective administration of a Medicaid managed care delivery system, public-private partnership,
and program flexibility.”).
24. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, REDESIGNING MEDICAID USING
THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 6 (2007), http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Issue%20Brief_
DRA_091807.pdf.
The most unique aspect of West Virginia’s new plan is the member agreement, which
adults must sign in order to have themselves or their children moved from the Basic Plan
to the Enhanced Plan. The member agreement, or personal responsibility contract,
includes broad responsibilities for individuals as well as beneficiary rightsFalse If the
state determines an individual has not met his or her responsibilities after one year of
enrollment, the individual or the child will be moved to the Basic Plan and must wait 12
months to qualify for reenrollment in the Enhanced Plan.
Id.
25. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 1, 2 (2010), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Infor
mation/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indianaplan-stc-01012008-12312012-amended-012010.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN].
The HIP provides a high-deductible health plan and an account styled like a health
savings account called a POWER Account to uninsured adults including low-income
custodial parents and caretaker relatives of Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance
program (CHIP) children and uninsured non-custodial parents and childless adults.
Participation in HIP is voluntary, but all enrollees will be required to receive medical care
through the high deductible health plans POWER Accounts.
Id.
26. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-384, MEDICAID
DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: APPROVAL PROCESS RAISES COST CONCERNS AND LACKS
TRANSPARENCY 46-47 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655483.pdf [hereinafter GAO-13384] (noting that “The program included a variety of features: a requirement for participants to
complete a health needs assessment—used to match enrollees with health maintenance
organizations and providers that meet the individual’s specific health care needs . . . .”).
27. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
PRIMARY CARE NETWORK DEMONSTRATION, UTAH 7 (2002), http://www.health.utah.gov/pcn/
pdf/Special%20Terms%20&%20Conditions.pdf; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
HEALTHY MICHIGAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (2010), https://www.medi
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/mi/mihealthy-michigan-fs.pdf.
Prior to its amendment to authorize Healthy Michigan, the demonstration provided federal
financial participation for the Adult Benefit Waiver (ABW) program, ABW provides a
limited ambulatory benefit package to previously uninsured, low-income non-pregnant
childless adults ages 19 through 64 years with incomes at or below 35 percent of the FPL
who are not eligible for Medicaid. The ABW program was first approved in January 2004
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The Obama Administration quietly let the HIFA waiver initiative
disappear, and initially seemed intent on curbing some of the arguable excesses
of Section 1115 waivers under the Bush Administration, ones that became “a
substitute for rulemaking or way to circumvent the law,” or that “push[ed]
states into compromising financing arrangements.” 28 Certain public-private
partnerships in the Medicaid program continued under the Obama
Administration prior to the enactment of the ACA, but it appeared that they
would no longer be favored for their own sake as they were under the Bush
Administration. 29
Additionally and notably, the ACA made significant changes in the way
that Section 1115 Medicaid waivers would be evaluated. The GAO and various
stakeholders had complained for years about the waiver process’s lack of
transparency and public input. 30 Accordingly, the ACA required the Secretary
to promulgate regulations putting in place “a process for public notice and
comment . . . sufficient to ensure a meaningful level of public input” both
before the state submits, and after the Secretary receives, a waiver application;
requirements regarding project goals, state and federal costs, and state
implementation plans; and a process for reporting on and evaluating the
demonstration project. 31 CMS also posted the general criteria that it uses to
determine whether Medicaid’s objectives are being met. 32 Additionally, it has

as a title XXI funded Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) [S]ection
1115 demonstration.
Id.
28. Cindy Mann & Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J. L., MED. & ETHICS
416, 422 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Letter from Carolyn L. Yocom, U.S. Gen. Accountability Office, to Senators
Charles Grassley, Max Baucus, & Henry A. Waxman, & Representative Joe Barton (Jan. 19,
2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10258r.pdf.
30. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-817, MEDICAID AND SCHIP:
RECENT HHS APPROVALS OF DEMONSTRATION WAIVER PROJECTS RAISE CONCERNS 2-4
(2002), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/235107.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04480, MEDICAID WAIVERS: HHS APPROVALS OF PHARMACY PLUS DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE
TO RAISE COST AND OVERSIGHT CONCERNS 2 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/2432
86.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-694R, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION
WAIVERS: LACK OF OPPORTUNITY FOR PUBLIC INPUT DURING FEDERAL APPROVAL PROCESS
STILL A CONCERN 2 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/95034.pdf; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-694R, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: RECENT
HHS APPROVALS CONTINUE TO RAISE COST AND OVERSIGHT CONCERNS 7 (2008),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/271789.pdf; GAO-13-384, supra note 26, at 2.
31. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74–271, § 1115(d), 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1315(d) (2012)).
32. Those criteria are whether the proposed demonstration will:
[I]ncrease and strengthen overall coverage of low-income individuals in the state; increase
access to, stabilize, and strengthen providers and provider networks available to serve
Medicaid and low-income populations in the state; improve health outcomes for Medicaid
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sought to standardize the waiver process by promulgating a standardized
waiver template and budget neutrality calculation form, and by more clearly
laying out standards for independent evaluation of project outcomes. 33
III. SECTION 1115 MEDICAID WAIVERS AFTER NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES V. SEBELIUS
The direction the Obama Administration would have taken, over time, on
its own accord regarding Section 1115 waivers will never quite be known
because of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation of
Independent Businesses (NFIB) v. Sebelius. NFIB v. Sebelius tilted the balance
of power in Medicaid waiver decisions from the federal to certain state
governments by making the ACA’s Medicaid expansion optional rather than
mandatory. 34 Just over half of the states initially refused to expand Medicaid to
all adults earning up to 133% FPL under the terms of the ACA. 35 They would
only agree to expand Medicaid, if at all, if CMS waived certain programmatic
conditions. 36 Many of these conditions both track and extend prior efforts by
and other low-income populations in the state; or increase the efficiency and quality of
care for Medicaid and other low-income populations through initiatives to transform
service delivery networks.
Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-pro
gram-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/section-1115-demonstrations.html (last visited Mar.
21, 2016).
33. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to State Medicaid
Dir. & State Health Official (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guid
ance/downloads/sho-12-001.pdf [hereinafter CMS, State Medicaid Letter]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM TEMPLATE, https://www.medi
caid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/downloads/fillable-1115demo-10-12v2.pdf.
34. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012).
Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care
Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that all States accepting such
funds comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their
existing Medicaid funding. Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human
Services the authority to do just that. It allows her to withhold all ‘further [Medicaid]
payments . . . to the State’ if she determines that the State is out of compliance with any
Medicaid requirement, including those contained in the expansion. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. In
light of the Court’s holding, the Secretary cannot apply § 1396 to withdraw existing
Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion.
Id. at 2607.
35. Id. at 2572, 2629.
36. See, e.g., MARYBETH MUSUMECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, THE ACA AND MEDICAID
EXPANSION WAIVERS 1 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-the-aca-and-medicaidexpansion-waivers (noting that, as of November 2015, six out of the thirty-one states participating
in the expansion had received waivers through which they planned to implement their expansion,
and one state, Pennsylvania, had previously sought and obtained an expansion waiver but had
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some right-leaning states to make Medicaid look and feel more like private
coverage, and to institute “personal responsibility” requirements. 37 Not
wanting to leave the poorest residents of those states with no secure access to
Medicaid coverage, the Obama Administration ultimately acquiesced to waiver
features that it might otherwise never have contemplated granting.
As states that initially balked at implementing the Medicaid expansion
slowly and ultimately contemplate taking up the expansion, the concessions
extracted from CMS have grown. Initially, Arkansas sought and obtained
approval in September 2013 for its “private option” expansion, 38 which
extends at least two qualified health plans (QHPs) in the “Silver” tier available
through state Exchanges to adults—other than “medically frail” adults and
Native Americans—in the expansion population, and provides wrap-around
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) coverage
for individuals ages nineteen and twenty. 39 The state pays the individual’s
premium on the individual’s behalf. 40 The following year, Arkansas sought
and obtained amendments to use a state-run system of non-emergency
transportation for the expansion population and, notably, to institute a system
of “Independence Accounts” into which the expansion population members
earning between fifty percent and 133% FPL must contribute. 41 If beneficiaries
fail to make the required contributions, then they must pay cost-sharing
amounts out-of-pocket at the point of service, and providers may deny services

abandoned it in favor of the standard expansion mechanism when the state elected a new
governor).
37. See, e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Personal Responsibility: A Plausible Social Goal, but Not
for Medicaid Reform, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 16, 16 (2008); Laura D. Hermer, Medicaid, Low
Income Pools, and the Goals of Privatization, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 405-06 (2010)
[hereinafter Hermer, Medicaid].
38. Letter from Eliot Fishman, Dir., State Demonstrations Grp., to John Selig, Dir., Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs. (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-In
formation/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-private-option-ca.pdf.
39. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
ARKANSAS HEALTH CARE INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM (PRIVATE OPTION) 9-10, 13, 14 (2015),
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down
loads/ar/ar-private-option-ca.pdf [hereinafter ARKANSAS HC INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM].
40. Id. at 11.
41. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to John
Selig., Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Dec. 31, 2014); ARKANSAS HC INDEPENDENCE
PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 15-17. Individuals earning between fifty percent and 100% FPL
must contribute at least five dollars per month to their Independence Account; those earning
between 100% and 133% FPL must contribute between ten and twenty-five dollars, on a sliding
scale. Id. at 16-17. If beneficiaries fail to make the required contributions, then they must pay
cost-sharing amounts out of pocket at the point of service, and individuals making more than
100% FPL may be denied services. Id. at 18. Funds in the account may be used for cost-sharing
amounts or premium payments for QHPs if the individual becomes ineligible for Medicaid. Id. at
6 (Attachment C).
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to them. 42 According to its own terms, the waiver is intended to promote
continuity of care by smoothing out the effects of churning between Medicaid
and private coverage; improve reimbursement rates for providers and
accordingly improving access to care by reimbursing providers at market rates
rather than Medicaid rates; and promote beneficiary responsibility by making
them contribute to the cost of their care as a condition of enrollment. 43
These three goals are common features of many expansion state plans.
Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, and New Hampshire provide premium assistance for
QHPs or other coverage to part or all of the Medicaid expansion population. 44
With the exception of New Hampshire, these states require many beneficiaries,
even in some cases those earning less than 100% FPL, to pay premiums or
other forms of financial contribution. 45 Iowa and New Hampshire pay
providers private coverage rates for services provided through a QHP. 46 Iowa

42. ARKANSAS HC INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 2.
43. Id. at 3.
44. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., WAIVER LIST: IOWA MARKETPLACE
CHOICE PLAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION IOWA 1 (2015), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medi
caid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ia/ia-marketplace-choiceplan-ca.pdf [hereinafter IOWA WAIVER LIST]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: IOWA MARKETPLACE CHOICE PLAN 1 (2015),
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down
loads/ia/ia-marketplace-choice-plan-ca.pdf [hereinafter IOWA CHOICE PLAN]; CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, INDIANA SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 9 (2015),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down
loads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY
INDIANA PLAN 2.0]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND
CONDITIONS: NEW HAMPSHIRE HEALTH PROTECTION PROGRAM PREMIUM ASSISTANCE 2
(2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/11
15/downloads/nh/nh-health-protection-program-premium-assistance-ca.pdf [hereinafter NEW
HAMPSHIRE HEALTH PROTECTION PROGRAM]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: HEALTHY MICHIGAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION 8
(2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/11
15/downloads/mi/mi-healthy-michigan-ca.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY MICHIGAN]. Michigan will
start providing the expansion population earning over 100% FPL with the opportunity to choose a
QHP rather than the Medicaid plan starting in 2018. Id. at 3.
45. IOWA CHOICE PLAN, supra note 44, at 8; HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 1718; HEALTHY MICHIGAN, supra note 44, at 12-13. If Arizona’s proposed waiver is granted, then
it too will join this list, as it proposes to charge all non-disabled adults between eighteen and
sixty-four without dependent children a premium amount equal to two percent of their income or
twenty-five dollars per month, whichever is less. DOUGLAS E. DUCEY, ARIZ. HEALTH CARE
COST CONTAINMENT SYS., ARIZONA’S APPLICATION FOR A NEW SECTION 1115
DEMONSTRATION 5-6 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/
By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/az/az-hccc-pa2.pdf.
46. IOWA WAIVER LIST, supra note 44, at 2; NEW HAMPSHIRE HEALTH PROTECTION
PROGRAM, supra note 44, at 2. Presumably Michigan will as well once that program goes into
effect. HEALTHY MICHIGAN, supra note 44, at 13. Indiana used to pay providers Medicare rates
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and Indiana require members of the expansion population earning at least
100% FPL to contribute to either premium or cost-sharing accounts, or else be
disenrolled. 47
These features, among others, are quite different than anything one would
find within the traditional parameters of Medicaid. Medicaid is a program for
impoverished Americans who typically have minimal, if any, access to health
insurance, and as such, has traditionally shielded beneficiaries from premium
payments, cost-sharing, and other requirements. 48 A majority of states do make
use of private managed care plans in their Medicaid programs, but omit many
key features commonly found in such plans when offered on the private
market. They must include certain benefits, such as non-emergency medical
transportation, that private market plans do not cover. 49 If they charge
premiums at all, states may charge them only to beneficiaries earning at least
150% FPL. 50 Cost-sharing must be “nominal,” if imposed at all, for
beneficiaries earning up to 100% FPL. 51 For those earning between 100% and
150% FPL, cost-sharing amounts are limited to no more than ten percent of the
cost of a given item or service, and, in aggregate over the course of a month or
quarter, no more than five percent of the family’s income. 52 States do not
require “prepayment” of such costs into a health spending account, to the
extent they charge them at all in their traditional Medicaid program, nor do
they penalize beneficiaries for failing to make such prepayments. 53 They do
not require beneficiaries to seek and obtain certain forms of health care, such
as preventive and/or dental services, nor penalize them for failing to do so.54

under the first iteration of Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP), but now pays only about seventy-five
percent of Medicare rates. See, e.g., IND. HEALTH COVERAGE PROGRAMS BULLETIN, IHCP
ANNOUNCES PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT RATE INCREASES WITH HIP 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION
(Jan. 27, 2015), www.indianamedicaid.com/ihcp/Bulletins/BT201504.pdf.
47. IOWA CHOICE PLAN, supra note 44, at 2. If beneficiaries complete the required “healthy
behaviors” within the relevant time periods, however, they will not be subject to premium
payments. Id. at 17; HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 24. Indiana also imposes a
twenty five dollar fee for non-emergent use of emergency departments under most circumstances
after the first such usage each year. Id. at 27. Arizona’s waiver proposal also would disenroll
members under such circumstances. DUCEY, supra note 45, at 75.
48. Medicaid, supra note 4.
49. 42 C.F.R. § 440.170(a) (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(70) (2012).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(c)(1) (2012). Most children, pregnant women, terminally ill
individuals, individuals living in an institution who are required to spend nearly all their income
on the cost of their care, certain women with breast or cervical cancer, certain disabled children,
and Native Americans are exempt from having to pay premiums. See id. § 1396o-1(b)(3).
51. Id. § 1396o-1(a)(2).
52. Id. § 1396o-1(b)(1).
53. For penalties that may be imposed on certain populations for failing to pay premiums
and/or cost-sharing, see id. § 1396o-1(d).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(10), 1396d(a)(13) (2012).
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They are strictly limited in the amount they may charge beneficiaries as a copayment for obtaining non-emergency care in an emergency department. 55
Mindful of the public purse, they also typically reimburse providers, especially
physicians, at substantially lower than private market rates for services
provided under state Medicaid programs. 56
What difference, if any, do these variances between traditional Medicaid
and private market plans make? Do they make traditional Medicaid
beneficiaries less mindful of the amount of care they use, or do they have little
impact in that respect? Do they make it easier for traditional Medicaid
beneficiaries to keep their coverage, as long as they remain eligible for the
program, or is there little quantifiable evidence of their effect in that regard? Is
there any difference in health outcomes between individuals enrolled in one
versus the other type of plan? Does the provision of coverage with private
market trappings make recipients more likely to eschew cash welfare
programs, remain employed, keep their medical appointments, and be
otherwise respectable members of society than their peers with traditional
Medicaid coverage? How, if at all, do these outcomes differ between states
utilizing one of the two different types of approaches?
Before we move on to address these questions, I would like to introduce a
different collection of waiver programs, one that takes a different philosophy
toward Medicaid coverage. This group is not as amenable to pigeonholing as
the last. However, one can argue that, rather than the “welfare” approach of the
last group, this one takes more of a “public health” approach to Medicaid.
None of the states in this group have sought their waivers as a condition of
participating in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Instead, they have, for the
most part, taken an expansive approach to health coverage that predates the
ACA, in many cases on the theory that, because federal health reform, preACA, seemed unlikely to occur, they should work on reforming their own
coverage systems as best as possible. Following enactment of the ACA, some
states have continued with this project and are using or seeking to use Section
1115 Medicaid waivers in the process. These states include Vermont, 57
California, 58 and Oregon. 59

55. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o-1(e).
56. See, e.g., Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Index, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2012), http://kff.org/
medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-to-medicare-fee-index/. Medicare rates typically are lower than
private market rates. See Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private
Insurers: Growth Rates in Spending Over Three Decades, 22 HEALTH AFF. 230, 230 (2003).
57. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., VERMONT SECTION 1115
DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (2015), http://www.aucd.org/docs/policy/hcbs/vt-global-commit
ment-to-health-fs.pdf.
58. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CALIFORNIA BRIDGE TO
REFORM SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medi
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While these states’ waiver programs are quite different, there are a number
of common features to them. Foremost, they are seeking a more unified and
systematic approach that extends coverage to as many of their residents as
possible. 60 They are creating integrated health care delivery systems that take a
holistic approach to patient needs. 61 These systems go beyond encouraging
changes to delivery systems by paying for outcomes rather than services, for
example. Rather, they often expressly utilize medical home-based models and
include coverage for non-traditional services such as child care, housing and
homeless services, foster care supports, and job training. 62 These waiver

caid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ca/ca-bridge-to-health-re
form-fs.pdf.
59. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
OREGON HEALTH PLAN 5 (2012), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Informa
tion/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/or/or-health-plan2-ca.pdf [hereinafter OREGON HEALTH
PLAN].
60. See CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., MEDI-CAL 2020: KEY CONCEPTS FOR
RENEWAL 4, 30-34 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ca/ca-bridge-to-health-reform-pa.pdf [hereinafter CAL. DEP’T
OF HEALTH CARE SERVS.]. California is presently seeking to reform its Medicaid
disproportionate share hospital program (DSH), which provides federal and state funding to
hospitals that care for a disproportionately large share of uninsured and Medicaid patients. Id.
DSH funds have often been provided in many states with few strings attached. Id. California,
however, is proposing to disburse DSH funds under a “global payment” system which would
direct care for the remaining uninsured population to designated public hospitals that would
receive a set budget within which to provide a set list of services to them. Id. But see, e.g.,
Soumya Karlamangla, Civil Rights Complaint Filed Against Medi-Cal, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15,
2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-civil-rights-complaint-filed-against-medical-20151213-story.html (reporting on a complaint that several California civil rights
organizations filed with the federal Department of Health and Human Services, complaining that
reimbursement rates are so low that beneficiaries cannot access care). Oregon has sought a more
rational and cost-effective approach over the last few decades to health care in order, in part, to
extend coverage to a greater portion of the state’s population. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note
59, at 5-7. In addition to covering the expansion population and others through its Global
Commitment to Health waiver, Vermont is also providing additional subsidies to Vermonters
earning less than 300% FPL to purchase coverage on the state Exchange. VERMONT, supra note
23, at 2.
61. CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 5; VERMONT, supra note 23, at
32; OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 7.
62. CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 27-28. Oregon has been
instituting Patient-Centered Primary Care Homes intended to not only manage and coordinate
members’ health care services but also provide individual and family support services provided
by community health workers, peer support and wellness specialists, doulas, and others. OREGON
HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 19, 22, 26. Vermont’s Blueprint for Health Model takes a
community-based approach to health. See STATE OF VT. AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVS.,
QUARTERLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2015-MARCH 31, 2015 16-17 (2015),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down
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programs are also taking a more expansive approach to population health,
under the theory that health care, as traditionally conceived, plays only one
part in achieving the larger goal of ensuring that people have access to the
conditions necessary to lead healthy lives. 63 They typically do so, moreover,
without requiring beneficiaries to pay additional premiums or cost-sharing for
services, and without imposing other “personal responsibility” requirements. 64
Expanding coverage while improving population health within the
resource constraints of state Medicaid programs, particularly given the federal
policy of requiring budget neutrality for waiver programs, may appear to be a
daunting task, particularly without requiring funding from additional sources,
such as from the beneficiaries themselves. But as we will see, it may in fact be
less costly to take the population health approach espoused by states such as
Vermont, California, and Oregon, than it is to take the approach championed
by states such as Indiana, Iowa, and Michigan. Additionally, to the extent data
is available, health and other outcomes for programs such as Oregon’s are
better than those of programs such as Indiana’s.
IV. THE HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0
Governor Mike Pence of Indiana had no intention of participating in the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion under the terms given in the ACA when he took
office in 2013. 65 At the time, the state had a program covering traditional
Medicaid eligibility categories. 66 It additionally covered an expansion
population under the “Healthy Indiana” Plan (HIP), a Section 1115 waiver
granted by the second Bush Administration at the end of 2007. 67 HIP allowed
the State to extend private coverage of a relatively broad range of health care

loads/vt/Global-Commitment-to-Health/vt-global-commitment-to-health-qtrly-rpt-jan-mar2015.pdf [hereinafter VERMONT QUARTERLY REPORT].
63. Thus, for example, California is proposing to use Medicaid funds to cover services
intended to help at-risk beneficiaries to stay in their homes or to secure stable housing. CAL.
DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 24-26. Oregon’s Coordinated Care
Organizations are charged with taking a population-health approach to health care. See OREGON
HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 5, 7, 26 (referencing Section VII of the plan relating to
measurement of quality care and access to care).
64. See CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 3; OREGON HEALTH PLAN,
supra note 59 at 10, 19; VERMONT QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 62, at 4.
65. Maureen Groppe Star & Mary Beth Schneider, Expansion is a Bad Idea, Say Daniels,
Pence, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 29, 2012, at A1. Mitch Daniels, the governor at the time of the
decision in 2012, was leaving office and left the decision regarding expansion to the incoming
governor. Id.
66. See Hermer, Medicaid, supra note 37, at 419.
67. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HIP HEALTHY INDIANA PLANSM HEALTH
COVERAGE = PEACE OF MIND 4 (2014), http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_Waiver_Renewal
_(Final_6_30_14).pdf.
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benefits to a small, capped number of the State’s uninsured adult population
who did not otherwise qualify for Medicaid. 68
In February 2013, Governor Pence initially proposed a mere extension of
HIP. 69 He wrote in his letter to then-Secretary Sebelius:
Medicaid is broken. It has a well-documented history of substantial waste,
fraud and abuse. It has failed to keep pace with private market innovations that
have created efficiencies, controlled costs, and improved quality. It has done
little to improve health outcomes and does not adequately reimburse providers.
Its burdensome rules and unwieldy regulations do not allow states to
70
effectively manage their programs.

Pence claimed that HIP offered a better potential vehicle for expanding
Medicaid, and that his State would not consider expanding Medicaid unless
CMS first agreed to an extension of HIP, which was set to expire in 2013.71
CMS summarily denied the request less than two weeks later, due to the
State’s failure to comply with the ACA’s public notice and comment
provisions. 72 Notwithstanding the unpromising start, the Pence Administration
and CMS ultimately reached an agreement in January 2015—Indiana would
participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, but would do so using HIP as a
vehicle. 73
HIP 2.0’s provisions and requirements are complex. HIP 2.0 offers
benchmark coverage through managed care organizations (MCO) 74 to nondisabled, non-elderly adults earning 133% FPL or less, 75 and who are not

68. Typically, the waiver covered only about five percent of the eligible, uninsured
population at any given time. See, e.g., Laura D. Hermer & Merle Lenihan, The Future of
Medicaid Supplemental Payments: Can They Promote Patient-Centered Care?, 102 KY. L.J. 287,
308, 313 (2013-2014).
69. Letter from Michael Pence, Governor of Ind., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs. (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/
By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indiana-plan-extreq-ltr-02132013.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Pence to Sebelius].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Letter from Diane T. Gerrits, Dir., Div. of State Demonstrations & Waivers, to Patricia
Casanova, Dir., Office of Medicaid Policy & Planning (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.medicaid.
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indi
ana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indiana-plan-ext-deny-ltr-02252013.pdf.
73. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 2.
74. For a summary of the plans available under HIP 2.0, see generally Healthy Ind. Plan,
Health Plan Summary, IN. GOV., http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/IN-HIP-PlanChartSmmry_41
MAX_ 031015.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
75. 138% with the five percent income disregard. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)
(2012).
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otherwise eligible for Medicaid. 76 It differs from the original HIP in a number
of respects. Unlike the original HIP, HIP 2.0 has no annual or lifetime limits on
coverage, and also offers broader coverage—though at a lower reimbursement
rate than the original HIP. 77 There are three different types of plans under HIP
2.0. HIP Basic covers all “essential health benefits,” including but not limited
to primary care, inpatient and outpatient medical care, hospice care, home
health care, maternal care, mental and behavioral health care, and
pharmaceuticals. 78 HIP Plus covers the essential health benefits, plus vision
and dental care. 79 HIP Link is not coverage per se, but rather contributes up to
$4,000 toward the premium and cost-sharing amounts owed by HIP-eligible
individuals who have employer-sponsored coverage rather than HIP. 80 HIP
does not cover non-emergency medical transportation, and beneficiaries who
make non-emergent use of emergency department services are charged a
higher co-payment. 81
Coverage under HIP 2.0 is modeled on a private, high-deductible health
plan, just as it was under the original HIP. 82 Accordingly, the coverage comes
with a health savings account. 83 This account, called, as it was under the
original HIP, a Personal Wellness and Responsibility, or “POWER” account, is
funded by contributions from both the state and the beneficiary. 84
Beneficiaries—no matter how impoverished—must contribute two percent of
their income 85 each month to their POWER account; the state contributes the

76. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 8. Pregnant women who choose to stay
in HIP during their pregnancy may remain in HIP rather than being transferred to the state’s
traditional Medicaid program. Id. at 9.
77. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0: INTRODUCTION,
PLAN OPTIONS, COST SHARING, AND BENEFITS 32 (2015), http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_2
_0_Training_-_Introduction_Plans_Cost-Sharing_Benefits.pdf; IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS.
ADMIN., HIP 2.0 APPROVED! (2016), http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_PPT_2.0_2.16.
15.pdf.
78. Healthy Indiana Plan FAQ, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/2452.htm (last visited
Mar. 24, 2016). For a list of Indiana’s essential health benefits through 2016, see generally
Indiana EHB Benchmark Plan, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.
gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/Updated-Indiana-Benchmark-Summary.pdf
(last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
79. Healthy Indiana Plan FAQ, supra note 78.
80. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 15-16.
81. Id. at 14, 27.
82. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1
(2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/8529-healthy-indiana-planand-the-affordable-care-act1.pdf.
83. Id.
84. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 17.
85. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 20. Beneficiaries earning less than five
percent FPL must only contribute one dollar per month. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., WAIVER LIST: HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (HIP) 2.0 1 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/
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remainder. 86 When a beneficiary who makes such contributions uses covered
health care services, he must pay for them using a card issued in connection
with the account. 87 If a beneficiary uses more than $2,500—the maximum
amount in the POWER account—then the state will cover the remainder, other
than the twenty-five dollar copayment a beneficiary might owe due to nonemergent use of an emergency department. 88 If a beneficiary uses less than the
$2,500 in covered health care services, then she may roll over a portion of that
amount to the next year and thereby reduce the contributions she must make to
the account, provided she has never been disenrolled from HIP during a
coverage year. 89 Regardless of the amount in a beneficiary’s POWER account,
the MCO must pay for a covered service. 90 However, if a beneficiary is
terminated from the HIP for nonpayment of POWER account contributions,
and has used more health care than the value of his POWER account at the
time he received the service, he must repay the MCO up to the full value of the
contributions he would have owed that year. 91 Any amount such a beneficiary
fails to pay is treated as debt. 92
Rather than commencing on the date the individual applies for coverage, as
in traditional Medicaid, eligibility starts on the date an individual makes her
first payment to her POWER account, and is not retroactive. 93 Beneficiaries

Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-IndianaPlan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf [hereinafter INDIANA WAIVER LIST].
86. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 24.
87. Id. at 21-22. Preventive services are covered by the state at first dollar, rather than from
the POWER account. Id. at 22.
88. Id. at 27. The state is randomizing 5,000 HIP beneficiaries into a group that owes only
eight dollars per non-emergent use of the emergency department and will compare the emergency
department use of the two groups. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 22-24. If the beneficiary is enrolled in HIP Basic, then he must obtain at least one
age and gender appropriate preventive service in order to roll over any applicable amount in his
POWER account. Id. at 23. If a beneficiary is enrolled in HIP Plus, then she can have her
contribution doubled by obtaining such preventive care. Id.
90. Id. at 26.
91. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 20, 24-25. Individuals who fail to pay
due to a “qualifying event” are exempt from this requirement. Id. “Qualifying events” include
obtaining and then losing private coverage; having a loss of income after disqualification due to
increased income; taking up residence in another state; being a victim of a declared disaster;
being a domestic violence victim; and being or becoming medically frail. Id.
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 10-11. If an individual who is not required to make POWER account payments as a
condition of continued eligibility fails to make their first payment within sixty days, then their
eligibility for HIP starts on the first day of the first month in which the sixty day period ends. Id.
If an individual is screened for eligibility at a federally-qualified health center, a rural health
center, a community mental health center, or a public health department and is found to be
eligible for HIP, then, unlike other beneficiaries, the individual will be deemed presumptively
eligible at that time for a minimum of sixty days. Id.
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earning more than 100% FPL are required to make such contributions. 94 If they
fail to do so for more than sixty days, then their coverage is revoked and they
become ineligible for further coverage under HIP for six months. 95
Beneficiaries earning less than 100% FPL must make contributions to their
POWER account if they want HIP Plus; otherwise, they are only eligible for
HIP Basic. 96 Additionally, they become responsible for cost-sharing
payments. 97
As of July 31, 2015, only 27,828 individuals with incomes over 100% FPL
enrolled in HIP 2.0; the remainder of the 264,004 enrollees earned less than
100% FPL. 98 As the second HIP quarterly report observes, the low number of
individuals subject to the mandatory POWER account contribution may be due
to their enrollment, instead, in Marketplace coverage. 99 This is possible, as
individuals buying a Silver Marketplace plan would only be responsible for
paying two percent of their income toward premiums, and up to six percent of
out-of-pocket costs. 100 Individuals enrolled in HIP, on the other hand, are
responsible for paying only up to a maximum of five percent of their income,
an amount they will not likely reach, provided they diligently pay two percent
of their income monthly toward their POWER account. 101 While costs would
accordingly be higher in perhaps most cases for Marketplace coverage, it is
possible that some individuals would prefer to pay those costs rather than be
subject to the requirements and welfare trappings of HIP 2.0. The “Gateway to
Work” program is one such “welfare” feature of HIP 2.0. 102 It offers no-cost
assistance to HIP beneficiaries in finding work. 103 Although participation in
the program is voluntary, 104 and although the CMS approval letter expressly

94. Id. at 18.
95. Id. at 17, 24.
96. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 17. Rules for medically-frail individuals
and low-income individuals ages nineteen and twenty differ slightly, but neither group may be
disenrolled for failing to pay into their POWER account. Id. at 24-25.
97. Id. at 17.
98. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN DEMONSTRATION:
SECTION 1115 QUARTERLY REPORT tbl. 1 (2015), www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-ProgramInformation/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indianaplan-support-20-qtrly-rpt-may-july-10082015.pdf [hereinafter HIP 2D QUARTERLY REPORT].
99. Id.
100. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119,
311 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012)).
101. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 25. Only three percent of HIP
beneficiaries earning more than 100% FPL were disenrolled due to a failure to pay their POWER
account contribution. HIP 2D QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 98.
102. Gateway to Work, HEALTHY IND. PLAN, www.in.gov/fssa/hip/2466.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2016).
103. Id.
104. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

ON THE EXPANSION OF “WELFARE” AND “HEALTH” UNDER MEDICAID

253

noted that the program was “outside” of the HIP demonstration, 105 all HIP
beneficiaries who are either unemployed or who work less than twenty hours
per week are automatically referred to the program. 106
HIP’s POWER accounts are the program’s cornerstone. 107 Indiana expects
that contributing regularly to a POWER account will “encourage personal
responsibility, improve healthy behaviors, and develop cost conscious
consumer behaviors among all beneficiaries.” 108 POWER accounts and the
requirements associated with them are expressly intended to sharply
distinguish HIP from Medicaid. As an advisor to Governor Pence claimed,
“[i]t’s that we require people to make contributions. That really flies in the face
of the entitlement thing.” 109 And indeed, the mere requirement of contribution,
at least for those earning more than 100% FPL, does appear to be the main
point of the POWER account. There does not appear to be any serious belief
that the contributions will in fact substantially defray state costs. 110 They do
not count toward the federal match. 111 Their connection with healthy behaviors
is tenuous at best. 112 And they certainly do not improve the financial status of

105. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Joseph
Moser, Dir., Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medi
caid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/
in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf.
106. Gateway to Work, supra note 102.
107. See, e.g., Letter from Senator Richard Lugar et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y Health &
Human Servs. (Nov. 4, 2011), www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/in-healthy-indiana-plan-ar.pdf (noting that “the POWER
account was designed to be the cornerstone of HIP”).
108. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 2.
109. J. K. Wall, Pence Still Angling to Use Healthy Indiana Plan to Expand Medicaid, IND.
BUS. J. (Feb. 23, 2013), www.ibj.com/articles/39757-pence-still-angling-to-use-healthy-indianaplan-to-expand-medicaid. HIP 2.0 also offers, for beneficiaries who choose to use it, job training
and employment-related services. See, e.g., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 3.
While the employment features are voluntary under HIP 2.0, the state has sought to include them
among the objectives of the waiver. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY
INDIANA PLAN, DRAFT EVALUATION DESIGN 1 (2015), www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthyindiana-plan-support-20-draft-eval-design-10292015.pdf [hereinafter HIP DRAFT EVALUATION].
110. See ROBERT M. DAMLER & CHRISTINE MYTELKA, MILLIMAN CLIENT REPORT: 1115
WAIVER – HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN EXPANSION PROPOSAL 7 (2014), www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/
15-1115_Waiver_Expansion_-_2015.pdf (referring to Table 4).
111. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 40.
112. See, e.g., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN DEMONSTRATION, 1115 ANNUAL REPORT 50, 64
(2014), http://in.gov/fssa/hip/files/2012_HIP_Annual_Report.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY INDIANA
ANNUAL REPORT 2012]. While claiming that HIP copays caused HIP members to make more
judicious use of the emergency room than traditional Medicaid beneficiaries, the report observed
that “Survey respondents were also asked whether the [emergency room (ER)] copayment policy
ever caused them to decide not to go to the emergency room. Less than seven percent of members
reported that they avoided the ER because of the copayment.” Id.
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the poor and near-poor Indiana residents who must make contributions.
Nevertheless, the waiver’s special terms and conditions describe the purpose
given above for POWER accounts, among HIP 2.0’s other goals as
“promot[ing] the objectives of Title XIX [Medicaid].” 113
How well has HIP 2.0 been accomplishing these goals? Unfortunately,
there is not yet much publicly available information on which to base any
assessment. Data from the original waiver shows that individuals who received
HIP were largely grateful to have any health insurance at all, quite likely
because in most cases their alternative was to have none. 114 HIP members were
surveyed on their opinions of the program and whether it changed their health
habits, and demographic and economic data were collected, but the data—or at
least the portion of it that was released publicly—yielded few if any results that
would suggest that HIP yields better coverage and care outcomes for lowincome populations. 115 Finally, per member per month costs were greater for
the HIP population, overall, than for the traditional Medicaid population,
notwithstanding HIP’s POWER account that was intended to encourage
“responsible” use of health care services. 116 As for the present waiver, while it
has been in effect for nearly a year, Indiana is still negotiating with CMS over

113. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 2. Other goals include promoting
“increased access to health care services,” “increasing quality of care and efficiency of the health
care delivery system,” and “promoting private market coverage and family coverage options
through HIP Link to reduce network and provider fragmentation within families.” Id. Indiana is
testing the following as a condition of the waiver:
Whether a monthly payment obligation linked to a POWER account will result in more
efficient use of health care services; whether the incentives established in this
demonstration for beneficiaries to obtain preventive services and engage in healthy
behaviors will result in better health outcomes and lower overall health care costs; and
whether POWER account contributions in lieu of cost sharing for individuals participating
in the HIP Plus Plan will affect enrollment, utilization, and the use of preventive and other
services by beneficiaries.
Id.
114. See, e.g., HEALTHY INDIANA ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 112, at 91 (reporting
that, according to an unreleased 2013 Mathematica survey, seventy-six percent of HIP
beneficiaries were “very satisfied” with their coverage).
115. See generally id. (reporting demographic data, POWER account contribution and
rollover information, emergency department usage, use of preventive care services, chronic
disease prevalence, and HIP beneficiary opinion, but failing to compare the data to one or more
relevant control groups).
116. See, e.g., IND. OFFICE OF MEDICAID POLICY & PLANNING, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL
REVIEW 6, 13 (Dec. 2011) (showing that, while Hoosier Healthwise (traditional Medicaid) adults
receiving risk-based managed care cost an average of $293.48/month from July 2011 to
December 2011, HIP adults cost $2,486.71 per month. Even when one removes the highest-cost
HIP population (those in the Enhanced Services Plan), costs still were about 140% greater for
caretaker adults and 290% greater for non-caretaker adults in HIP than for comparable adults in
Hoosier Healthwise).
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the evaluation design for the program. 117 CMS, under the Obama
Administration, has standardized key features of Section 1115 waiver
applications, and has issued regulations making the evaluation component of
waivers more stringent than they were previously. 118 Hence, the evaluation of
HIP 2.0 may ultimately yield more useful data, which will actually be made
public, than the first HIP waiver did. 119
This will depend, however, on the study design CMS ultimately accepts.
Indiana’s proposed evaluation design for HIP offers few comparisons between
HIP and traditional Medicaid. Rather, to the extent that comparisons are made
at all, most of the comparisons are between HIP 2.0 beneficiaries and those
who are eligible but do not enroll, HIP 2.0 and HIP beneficiaries, or different
classes of HIP 2.0 beneficiaries. 120 This is problematic. The baseline
hypothesis of HIP 2.0 does not concern, for example, an assertion that the
second iteration contains programmatic improvements over the first, or that
HIP 2.0 beneficiaries are better off as compared to the uninsured. Rather, it is
that HIP 2.0—an ostensibly “consumer-driven” plan—is superior to Medicaid
qua “entitlement program.” 121 As such, it would seem that, if Indiana truly
wants to prove its point, it would seek to compare HIP 2.0 as against either
traditional Medicaid, with respect to its coverage of congruent beneficiaries, or
as against the standard ACA Medicaid expansion as carried out in similar
states wherever possible and relevant.
Yet that is neither what Indiana proposes, nor what CMS appears to be
seeking. On the one hand, this may have something to do with difficulties in
crafting a congruent in-state comparison. Because of the way the waiver is
structured, HIP 2.0 now covers most non-disabled, non-elderly adults who
used to be eligible for Medicaid in Indiana. 122 One needs to make apples-toapples comparisons, and without a sufficiently numerically robust comparison
group of non-disabled, non-elderly adults in traditional Medicaid in Indiana,
117. See, e.g., Letter from Andrea J. Casart, Acting Dir., Div. of Medicaid Expansion
Demonstrations, to Joseph Moser, Medicaid Dir., Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. (Oct. 29,
2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/11
15/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-draft-eval-design10292015.pdf (noting that CMS has concerns about Indiana’s proposed study design, and
suggesting revision).
118. See CMS, State Medicaid Letter, supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also
SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM TEMPLATE, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
119. Hermer & Lenihan, supra note 68, at 310 (noting some of the studies and data from the
original HIP waiver were never publicly released, though in some cases ostensible findings from
them were cited by Indiana’s Family and Social Services Administration).
120. See HIP DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109, at 26-30, 34-38, 40-41, 45-47, 50, 52-53.
121. See, e.g., Niki Kelly, HIP 2.0 Receives Federal Funding, J. GAZETTE (Jan. 25, 2015),
www.journalgazette.net/news/local/indiana/HIP-2-0-receives-federal-approval-4712263; see also
J.K. Wall, supra note 109.
122. See HIP DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109, at 4.
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comparing outcomes in HIP 2.0 against those in traditional Medicaid makes
little sense. On the other hand, parents and caretakers who are eligible for
Medicaid under the old cash welfare limits are still enrolled in traditional
Medicaid in Indiana. 123 Additionally, many states opted for the standard
Medicaid expansion under the ACA. 124 It could be useful to know how
features such as health outcomes, health care use, perceived health status, and
ease of benefit use compare between these two populations and the lowestincome HIP 2.0 beneficiaries. 125
Really, what we need from Indiana and the other waiver expansion states is
data that would help prove or disprove the assertion that providing lowerincome beneficiaries with personal responsibility requirements and the
trappings of private plans in fact furthers the objectives of Medicaid. Those
objectives, as provided by CMS, are to:
• increase and strengthen overall coverage of low-income individuals in the
state;
• increase access to, stabilize, and strengthen providers and provider networks
available to serve Medicaid and low-income populations in the state;
• improve health outcomes for Medicaid and other low-income populations in
the state; or
• increase the efficiency and quality of care for Medicaid and other lowincome populations through initiatives to transform service delivery
126
networks.

One suspects that CMS granted Indiana’s and other waiver expansion states’
waiver requests on the theory that coverage expansion testing nearly any
theory that arguably fits within the Secretary’s waiver authority is better than
no coverage expansion at all. If one compares Indiana’s demonstration against
the prospect of no coverage expansion at all, then indeed the proposal
“increase[s] and strengthen[s] overall coverage of low-income individuals in
the state,” and will likely also further others of CMS’s stated objectives. 127
Because the coverage expansion is optional, courtesy of NFIB v. Sebelius,
it is difficult to argue that CMS got the comparison group wrong here, at least

123. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.110(c) (2015) (enumerating the cash welfare limits); see also HIP
DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109, at 10.
124. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.
org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordablecare-act/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (compiling the list of states that have opted for the standard
Medicaid expansion under the ACA).
125. See HIP DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109 (exploring how Indiana proposes in some
cases to compare HIP 2.0 to expansion populations in other states, but not to the extent one might
expect for a robust comparison).
126. Section 1115 Demonstrations, supra note 32.
127. Id.
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with respect to doing the right thing for Indiana’s expansion population. But in
terms of doing what is right for Medicaid, granting the waiver does not appear
to be the right move. How does requiring non-nominal cost-sharing from lowincome beneficiaries, or designing the benefit plan to mimic a high-deductible
health plan, or delaying the start of coverage in most cases until the beneficiary
makes a POWER account contribution, or disenrolling and imposing a sixmonth lockout on a beneficiary for non-payment of required contributions, or
referring beneficiaries to employment services “increase and strengthen overall
coverage of low-income individuals in the state,” 128 or otherwise further
Medicaid’s goals? On the contrary, if one assumes that having stable access to
health care is a good, 129 then it would appear to weaken them. Ample evidence
already exists that imposing cost-sharing requirements on low-income
individuals has a deleterious effect on both their coverage and care. 130 It is not
obvious, then, how Indiana’s demonstration, among the other studies that

128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Mortality and Access to Care Among Adults after
State Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025, 1028-29 (2012) (finding a significant
reduction in all-cause mortality, a significant reduction in uninsurance, a significant decline in
delayed care, and a significant increase in rates of “excellent” or “very good” health following
state Medicaid expansions); Helen Levy & David Meltzer, What Do We Really Know About
Whether Health Insurance Affects Health? 33-34 (Dec. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the University of Chicago) (summarizing studies evaluating the effect of health
insurance on health, and finding that all but one suggest a positive effect); Joseph J. Sudano &
David W. Baker, Intermittent Lack of Health Insurance Coverage and Use of Preventive Services,
93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 130, 133-34 (2003) (finding that, the greater the number of intermittent
coverage gaps a person has, the less likely they are to use preventive care services when covered).
The ACA has been improving the stability of coverage, even over only the first year of its
implementation. See, e.g., Adele Shartzer & Sharon K. Long, Quick Take: More Adults Have
Stable Health Insurance Coverage as ACA Implementation Proceeds, Urban Institute Health
Reform Monitoring Survey, URB. INST. HEALTH POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://hrms.urban.
org/quicktakes/More-Adults-Have-Stable-Health-Insurance-Coverage-as-ACA-ImplementationProceeds.html; SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE RISE IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND
AFFORDABILITY SINCE HEALTH REFORM TOOK EFFECT 4-6 (David Blumenthal et al. eds., 2015)
(finding a decline in the number of adults reporting that they did not receive medical care because
of cost, and that uninsured adults reported difficulty in obtaining care due to cost at twice the rate
as insured adults).
130. Lauren Snyder and Robin Rudowitz, in their review of the relevant literature, found in
summary, among other findings, that premiums often impose a barrier to coverage for lowincome individuals; cost-sharing imposes substantial barriers to obtaining necessary care for lowincome individuals and can cause them to delay or omit treatment, whether necessary or
unnecessary, as well as sometimes substitute lower-cost treatment for higher-cost services; the
effect of cost-sharing on non-emergent use of emergency department services is mixed; and that
savings from cost-sharing accrue more from a decline in utilization rather than an increase in
patient revenue. LAUREN SNYDER & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING IN
MEDICAID: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 3, 6-7, 11 (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.
files.wordpress.com/2013/02/8417-premiums-and-cost-sharing-in-medicaid.pdf.
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require increased premium and/or cost-sharing from low-income beneficiaries,
could add anything sufficiently useful to what is already known on the subject
to warrant waiver approval. 131
There is no evidence that the purpose of Medicaid is to teach low-income
Americans the virtues of personal responsibility, whether they need such
education or not. Nor is there any evidence that the purpose of Medicaid is to
inculcate a respect for the free market, or small government, or any other
political or economic theory for that matter. Rather, Medicaid is intended to
extend financial access to a robust package of health services to populations
that typically lack such access via other means. 132 Should a state wish to “test”
a demonstration project that clearly, based on available evidence, either is
known not to further such a purpose, or otherwise falls outside of the
Secretary’s statutory authority to grant, the Secretary should deny the proposal.
V. THE OREGON HEALTH PLAN
Oregon’s Section 1115 waiver—the Oregon Health Plan (OHP)—presents
a very different case from Indiana’s. The original waiver began in 1994. 133
Oregon initially sought to achieve universal health coverage in the state, but
when that reform fell through, it instead focused on extending Medicaid
coverage to all state residents earning 100% FPL or less. 134 Because budget
neutrality required the state to find sufficient savings elsewhere in the program
to cover the expansion population it wanted to cover, Oregon proposed to
ration the services it offered through Medicaid. 135 It developed, and over the
years has refined and revised, a list of health condition and treatment pairs,
ranked in order of priority based on clinical and cost effectiveness. 136
Depending on available funding, the program draws a line on the list after a

131. Sidney Watson argues persuasively that, even where provisions in demonstration
proposals technically fall within the authority of the Secretary to grant, it may be an abuse of
discretion to grant a waiver purporting to study an issue where prior research has consistently
yielded a known result. Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using
Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 213, 218, 226 (2015).
132. Hermer, Medicaid, supra note 37, at 419.
133. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 5.
134. Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform Interrupted: The Unraveling of the Oregon Health
Plan, 26 HEALTH AFF. w96, w97 (2007).
135. Id. at w96. Nevertheless, in the current iteration of its waiver, Oregon received a $1.1
million dollar investment from HHS. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-239,
MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: APPROVAL CRITERIA AND DOCUMENTATION NEED TO SHOW
HOW SPENDING FURTHERS MEDICAID OBJECTIONS 17 (2015) [hereinafter GAO MEDICAID
DEMONSTRATIONS].
136. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 17; see Thomas Bodenheimer, The Oregon
Health Plan: Lessons for the Nation, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 720, 720 (1997).
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particular condition-treatment pair. 137 Conditions falling below that line are not
reimbursed; those falling above it are. 138 This feature of the OHP remains
today. 139
Under the current iteration of the OHP, all Medicaid beneficiaries other
than expansion adults (non-disabled, non-elderly, non-caretaker individuals
between eighteen and sixty-four years of age, earning up to 133% FPL) and
women eligible through the Breast and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program 140
receive OHP Plus. 141 OHP Plus provides all approved services on the
prioritized list, EPSDT services for individuals under age twenty-one, services
provided by “non-traditional health workers,” 142 person-centered primary care
home services, mental health facility services, long term care services,
intermediate care facility services for individuals with mental retardation, and
Medicare premium payments and cost-sharing. 143 Expansion adults receive the
Alternative Benefit Plan, which consists of essential health benefits on the
prioritized list. 144
These features of the OHP, however, are largely old news. The innovative
features have to do with the delivery system reforms that the State started in
2012. 145 Oregon’s goals for the current demonstration project are to “reduce
the trend in statewide Medicaid per capita spending” while “improving access
and quality.” 146 Toward those ends, rather than continuing to deliver and pay

137. Bodenheimer, supra note 136, at 723.
138. Id. at 653-54. If a treatment is not funded, providers are directed to inform patients of
appropriate treatments, even if not funded, and to write a prescription for such treatment where
relevant. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 17-18.
139. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 17. The prioritized list of services, current as
of October 1, 2015, draws the line below:
Condition: ACQUIRED PTOSIS AND OTHER EYELID DISORDERS WITH VISION
IMPAIRMENT (See Guideline Notes 64, 65, 130). Treatment: PTOSIS REPAIR.
HEALTH EVIDENCE REVIEW COMM’N, PRIORITIZED LIST OF HEALTH SERVICES 115 (2015),
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/herc/PrioritizedList/10-1-2015%20Prioritized%20List%20of%20
Health%20Services.pdf.
140. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 16. This population receives coverage for
relevant treatment for breast and/or cervical cancer or precancerous lesions for which they are
otherwise uninsured. See id. at 20.
141. Id. at 16, 20. Oregon covers pregnant women up to 185% FPL, children ages zero to one
up to 185% FPL, children one to eighteen up to 133% FPL, the aged, blind, and disabled at
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility (seventy-four percent FPL), women in the Breast
and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program up to 250% FPL, and expansion adults up to 133% FPL.
See id. at Attachment D.
142. Id. at 16. These individuals include community health workers, peer wellness specialists,
patient navigators, and doulas. Id. at 175.
143. Id. at 16-17.
144. Id. at 19.
145. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 22.
146. Id. at 174.
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for care in ways that have become standard in many state Medicaid programs,
Oregon is developing Care Coordination Organizations (CCO) through which
all care is delivered to its Medicaid population. 147 CCOs resemble statecreated, geographically demarcated accountable care organizations. 148 They
are community-based managed care organizations that are paid to deliver
primary care-based, full-spectrum care to a regional Medicaid population via a
global budget consisting of capitated per member per month payments and a
separate per member per month payment based on other services. 149 A portion
of the CCO’s reimbursement is withheld and disbursed based on whether the
CCO met certain quality and access metrics. 150 Providers who share in the
financial risk constitute a majority on each CCO’s governing board, and they
are given input through a community advisory council. 151
While CCOs primarily deliver medical care, their services go beyond
traditional health care offerings. 152 Community health workers and others
provide training, support, and case management services to certain mentally ill
and substance abusing populations. 153 Non-traditional health workers provide
home visits for newborns and their mothers. 154 Some job training and support
services for certain at-risk populations are provided. 155
CCOs are also charged with partnering with relevant agencies and
organizations. Partnering arrangements include, in particular, working with the
state Public Health Division to address social contributors to chronic
diseases. 156 CCOs are specifically charged under the waiver with developing
“Transformation Plans.” 157 These Plans address “social conditions beyond the
immediate control of a single individual or Coordinated Care Organization”
that constitute “systemic barriers and root causes of poor health outcomes,”
such as “persistent mental illness, addiction, homelessness, unemployment,

147. Id. at 7.
148. Or. Health Policy Bd., Coordinated care: the Oregon difference, OREGON.GOV,
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/OHPB/pages/health-reform/ccos.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
149. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 25, 31; see also OR. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY,
UPDATED ABCS OF CCOS: THE BASICS OF HOW OREGON AIMS TO TRANSFORM HEALTH CARE
1, 2 (2012), http://www.ocpp.org/media/uploads/pdf/2012/04/fs20120430CCOBasicsUpdated
fnl.pdf; Lauren Broffman & Kristin Brown, Year Two: Capturing the Evolution of Oregon’s
CCOs, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 15, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/15/year-two-cap
turing-the-evolution-of-oregons-ccos/.
150. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 33-34. The Special Terms and Conditions
contain detailed specifications regarding the relevant metrics. Id. at 34-37, 179-245.
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 25, 130.
153. Id. at 130-35.
154. Id. at 132.
155. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 135.
156. Id. at 194-95.
157. Id. at 183-84.
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lack of transportation and lack of quality education,” through “the community
needs assessment, community health improvement plan, the Community
Advisory Council and collaboration with state and local public health agencies
and community partners.” 158 In this and other goals, such as the elimination of
health care disparities, CCOs receive assistance from state entities that offer
training to CCOs and disseminate best practices developed at local levels. 159
Oregon is not alone in using Medicaid dollars for non-traditional services.
However, the State does stand out in being one of the only states that has, for
the most part, successfully justified to the satisfaction of the GAO that its
coverage of such services using Medicaid funds is reasonable under federal
requirements. 160 While the GAO admittedly did not look at the substance
behind the justifications, substantial research supports transforming health care
delivery systems from ones that reward increased care, regardless of quality or
outcomes, to ones that reward more efficient achievement of improved
population health outcomes and higher quality of care. 161

158. Id. at 195. The state asked CCOs to submit Transformation Plans addressing the
following eight areas:
• Developing and implementing a health care delivery model that integrates mental
health and physical health care and addictions. This plan must specifically address
the needs of individuals with severe and persistent mental illness.
• Continuing implementation and development of Patient-Centered Primary Care
Home (PCPCH).
• Implementing consistent alternative payment methodologies that align payment
with health outcomes.
• Preparing a strategy for developing Contractor’s Community Health Assessment
(CHA) and adopting an annual Community Health Improvement Plan (CHIP)
consistent with 2012 Oregon Laws, Chapter 8 (Enrolled SB 1580), Section 13.
• Developing electronic health records; health information exchange; and
meaningful use.
• Assuring communications, outreach, Member engagement, and services are
tailored to cultural, health literacy, and linguistic needs.
• Assuring provider network and staff ability to meet cultural diverse needs of
community (cultural competence training, provider composition reflects Member
diversity, nontraditional health care workers composition reflects Member
diversity).
• Developing a quality improvement plan focused on eliminating racial, ethnic and
linguistic disparities in access, quality of care, experience of care, and outcomes.
Or. Health Auth., Transformation Plan Key Component Guidance and Technical Assistance,
OREGON.GOV, https://cco.health.oregon.gov/Pages/transformationplan.aspx (last visited Mar. 6,
2016).
159. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 195-98.
160. GAO MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS, supra note 135, at 28-34.
161. See, e.g., Scott Buris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A
Public Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (2011); regarding health
care delivery, see Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH
AFF. 759, 761-62 (2008); MAUREEN BISOGNANO & CHARLES KENNEY, PURSUING THE TRIPLE
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To date, CCOs appear to be making some positive differences in the health
of the populations they serve, as well as decreasing utilization of unnecessary
services. Not all outcomes were good. For example, utilization of some
preventive care services, such as Pap and chlamydia tests, declined, as did,
children’s access to primary care providers. 162 Nevertheless, reported access to
care improved slightly in 2014. 163 All-cause readmission rates declined from
12.8% in 2013 to 11.4% in 2014. 164 Emergency department use declined from
50.5 per 1,000 member months in 2013 to 47.3 in 2014. 165 Avoidable
emergency department use declined by almost half from 2011 to 2014. 166 More
physicians reported seeing Medicaid patients, and patient satisfaction scores
improved. 167 Both inpatient and outpatient costs have decreased since 2011. 168
At the same time, most CCOs are receiving 100% or more of their quality pool
payments, and all CCOs met at least ten of their seventeen quality
improvement targets. 169
An initiative such as Oregon’s could easily flounder in many different
respects. For example, the state could merely be paying lip service to the triple
aim of cost containment, better care, and improved population health. The state
could support the program’s goals, but fail to provide adequate centralized
guidance, support, and funding to local CCOs in the latter’s pursuit of them.
Local providers could fail to trust each other and/or the state program
adequately to work together efficiently and responsively. So far, however, it
appears that none of these issues have yet materialized to a sufficiently
substantial degree to put the program in jeopardy. As Lauren Broffman and
Kristin Brown observe, CCOs realized the state had a vested interest in their
success, and started to act accordingly. 170 Providers’ intrinsic interests in
“working with the others to figure out how to do things better” are also having
a positive effect, in conjunction with other drivers, particularly financial
ones. 171 It remains to be seen, though, whether the program will build

AIM: SEVEN INNOVATORS SHOW THE WAY TO BETTER CARE, BETTER HEALTH, AND LOWER
COSTS 4-5 (Jossey-Bass, 1st ed. 2012); John W. Whittington et al., Pursuing the Triple Aim: The
First 7 Years, 93 MILBANK Q. 263, 296-98 (2015).
162. Or. Health Auth., Oregon’s Health System Transformation: 2014 Performance Report
26, 28-32, 35 (June 24, 2015), http://www.oregon.gov/oha/Metrics/Documents/2014%20Final%
20Report%20-%20June%202015.pdf.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Id. at 16.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id. at 20.
167. Or. Health Auth., supra note 162, at 92-95.
168. Id. at 111-12.
169. Id. at 4, 6.
170. Broffman & Brown, supra note 149.
171. Id.
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momentum while managing to avoid or successfully manage the many
potential pitfalls that may arise in the process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medicaid waivers granted under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act
are supposed to be reserved only for testing “any experimental, pilot, or
demonstration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to
assist in promoting the objectives of [Medicaid].” 172 Those objectives have
been clearly stated by CMS. Yet CMS has granted, and continues to grant,
waivers for demonstration projects that either do not need to be tested because
the outcome is already known, or that do not promote the stated objectives of
Medicaid, such as Indiana’s HIP waiver and others like it.
Medicaid is a program intended to provide health care to individuals who
would otherwise likely lack it. 173 It is in the business of health promotion and
preservation. Oregon’s waiver is among those that seek to further such goals.
Indiana’s, however, is not. Its punitively-structured, non cost-effective benefit
package does not seek to test better, more efficient and effective ways to
provide access to care and promotion of health. Rather, it is more likely that it
is intended, as suggested by some comments made by those in the Pence
Administration, 174 to point the way toward dismantling Medicaid, and perhaps
providing something else in its place. States ought not to play games with the
lives and health of their most impoverished residents. At the same time, CMS
ought not to play games with the nature of Medicaid. CMS should more
strictly adhere to the purposes of Medicaid in deciding whether to grant
Section 1115 Medicaid waivers.

172. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a) (2014) (codifying Section 1115 of the Social Security Act).
173. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10) (2012).
174. Letter from Pence to Sebelius, supra note 69.
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